This paper studies the role played by the IMF during sovereign debt restructurings and extract lessons for future official interventions. To do so, I compare twelve recent debt restructurings. I begin by detailing the main features ("restructuring strategies") of each episode. I then analyze the involvement of the Fund and relate it to the above-cited strategies. Despite the wide heterogeneity both in restructuring strategies and in the scope of IMF's involvement, the Fund exerted a substantial influence. This influence came, not only through the provision of official finance and by setting an adjustment path through conditionality, but also by providing independent information and influencing countries decision to restructure by providing incentives both to creditors and debtors. My conclusion is that the flexibility that has characterized the role of the IMF so far might have exacerbated uncertainty and induced undesirable strategies from debtors and creditors alike. Thus, the international community could benefit from granting the IMF a more standardized operational role, reducing gambling for resurrection strategies and fostering fairness. Along these lines, I present ideas for reframing the IMF's engagement in sovereign debt restructurings. 
Introduction
The issue of sovereign debt restructurings, which so much focus is receiving as the crisis in Europe evolves, has long figured prominently in the international policy agenda. 3 The beginning of the century witnessed an intense debate on whether the international community should adopt a statutory approach centred on the establishment of an official debt restructuring mechanism to address sovereign insolvencies (Krueger, 2002) . Ultimately, this proposal was dropped in favour of a less ambitious contractual approach based on the inclusion of collective action clauses and other innovations in international bond issuances. Apart from committing the Institution to promote collective action clauses, this approach left the role of the IMF in coping with sovereign debt restructurings essentially unchanged.
In the face of the current turmoil in the Euro Zone, the role of the IMF in lending to distressed sovereigns has become again an important element of the debate. Thus, the European Stability
Mechanism has been designed to resemble the IMF's framework as much as possible. 4 Thus, it is important to understand the merits and pitfalls of the Fund's approach in order to guide the design of these new safety nets for sovereigns. As a matter of fact, the IMF's toolkit does not include any instrument specifically designed to deal with sovereign debt restructurings. 5 Unfortunately, while this has provided the Fund with some flexibility to react to specific circumstances on a case by case basis, it has come at the cost of exacerbating the uncertainty that surrounds the official response to such episodes. In most cases, the IMF's involvement has been articulated around a financial program approved either prior to the sovereign's restructuring plan, or as a result of it. Formally, there is no distinction between such programs and "traditional" IMF-supported programs. Only if a country falls into arrears with its external private creditors, as it is often the case during sovereign debt restructurings, does the policy of Lending into Arrears (LiA) come into effect. This is why the LiA policy is often associated with the role of the IMF in sovereign debt restructurings. However, it is important to note that there is scope both for debt restructurings backed by an IMF program without activating the LiA policy (in the case of "pre-emptive" restructurings in which the sovereign remains current on its external debt payments) and for programs under the LIA policy in which only minor components of sovereign debt are re-negotiated in order to settle pending arrears.
As a result of the broad-based discontent with the Fund's controversial role during the Argentine restructuring (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , the role of the IMF in these episodes came under scrutiny (Simpson, 2006) . 6 Indeed, this episode raised awareness about a number of shortcomings relating the Fund's engagement in debt restructurings (see Diaz-Cassou et al., 2008) . First, the Fund's financial exposure to the restructuring country tends to generate a conflict of interest for the Institution, as it may come to be perceived as primarily concerned with safeguarding its resources and preserving its preferred creditor status (Simpson, 2006) , reducing its credibility as an impartial player in the crisis resolution process. This conflict of interests tends to be accentuated in the case of large inherited programs. Moreover, unless total Fund's exposure increases, extensions of on-going programs or programs approved in order to succeed the inherited ones do not provide fresh resources and, at least partially, simply roll-over existing obligations to the Fund, undermining the debtor-in-possession argument as a justification for the policy of Lending Into Arrears. 7 Second, the good faith criterion, which conditions the Fund's financial support to countries with outstanding external arrears (LiA), lacks economic content and is judgemental in nature, leaving scope for arbitrariness in its interpretation. Third, in order not to interfere with the negotiations between the sovereign debtor and its private creditors, some have argued that the IMF should restrain from providing the "resource envelope" of the restructuring through its program's macroeconomic framework. Others, instead, argue that this is a key feature of the public good provided by the IMF during a restructuring process. Finally, intimately linked to the above is the ambiguity stemming from the Fund's role as a provider of information and the question of whether the Institution should systematically provide the parties involved in the restructuring with a debt sustainability analysis.
In order to provide food for thought regarding these issues and, more in general, the role of the IMF in sovereign debt restructurings we carry out a comprehensive analysis of 12 recent sovereign debt restructurings (Argentina, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uruguay) and attempt to identify the various dimensions of the Fund's involvement in those processes. 8 The next section briefly describes the only policy in place explicitly designed to cope with sovereign defaults, the LiA Policy, and how it evolved since its inception. Section 3 presents our case studies and describes their evolution across a number of 5 This is despite the fact that in recent years the IMF has changed its lending policies by creating front-loaded unconditional facilities (FCL, PCL, rapid credit line, exceptional access). 6 Indeed the LiA policy was one of the specific items for revision under the IMF's 2006 medium term strategic review. 7 As Fund credit is senior, on account of the Fund's preferred creditor status, investors draw a parallel between the extension of Fund credit to a sovereign with arrears to private creditors and debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing to distressed private debtors (IMF, 2002) . As the provision of official financial support may contribute to preserve the economic value of creditors' claims and facilitate the normalization of the member's external financial position, some have established a parallelism between LiA programs and DiP financing in private bankruptcies. 8 While in most of our cases IMF-supported programs were in place around the time of the restructuring, not in all was the LIA policy applied.
dimensions relevant for the reframing of the IMF's role in debt restructurings. Section 4 discusses the various roles played by the IMF in the episodes under scrutiny and how this relates to the above mentioned characteristics of the exchange. The final section presents the main caveats of the current framework and provides ideas regarding the role the IMF could have.
IMF's policy during sovereign debt crises: The Lending Into Arrears policy
Until 1989 the IMF stuck to a policy of non-toleration of arrears to external private creditors, meaning that all financial programs required the elimination of external arrears and the nonaccumulation of new ones during the program period (IMF, 1999) . This policy was seen as instrumental to provide both members states and private creditors with incentives to seek a timely agreement in order to clear arrears and restructure the debt. The protraction of the 1980's debt crisis, however, gradually undermined the rationale behind the non-toleration of arrears. Indeed, mainly due to the development of a secondary market for banks' claims and of the strengthening of commercial banks' balance sheets, private creditors showed increasing reluctance to engage in constructive negotiations with their sovereign debtors. In this context, the non-toleration of arrears became a de facto veto power assigned to commercial banks over the Fund's lending decisions.
The policy of lending into arrears, therefore, was introduced as an explicit move to reduce private creditors' leverage over the Fund's decision to support crisis countries. The new policy legalised the Fund's lending to countries in arrears to commercial banks, subject to the existence of a discernible negotiation process ongoing. It also allowed for further accumulation of arrears during the program period. This paved the way for a more active IMF involvement in the resolution of the debt crisis, and has remained ever since a pillar of the Fund's role in sovereign debt restructurings.
There have been various modifications of the LiA policy since its inception (IMF, 2002) . In 1998, it was broadened to encompass bonded debt, reflecting the securitization of sovereign debt. One year later, the policy was modified again to soften the requirements that negotiations be in place in order for a program to be approved. Under the new policy, formal negotiations are not required to have begun as long as the member state is deemed to be making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement. This change aimed at reflecting that, given the heterogeneity and number of bondholders potentially involved, initiating negotiations for the restructuring of bonded debt is likely to be harder than for syndicated loans. A last modification, in 2002, introduced various principles aimed at guiding the interpretation of the good faith criterion.
As we have seen, in essence, the LiA policy constitutes a legal device to allow the Fund's lending in a set of circumstances in which financial programs were previously ruled out. There are two procedural elements which differentiate a LiA program from 'traditional' programs. On the one hand, the good faith criterion is included as an additional condition for the Fund's disbursements.
The lack of a clear definition of what "good faith" means called for a subsequent issuance of some principles to assess whether a member is undertaking efforts to reach a collaborative agreement with its private creditors. The principles are: (i) the member should engage in an early dialogue with creditors, (ii) the member should share relevant information on a timely basis 9 , (iii) the member should provide creditors with an early opportunity to give input on the design of restructuring strategies and individual instruments. Notwithstanding this clarification, the good faith criterion is still perceived as fundamentally judgemental (Simpson, 2006) . On the other hand, while arrears remain outstanding, financing assurances reviews shall be conducted before disbursements are made available. Such reviews aim at determining whether adequate safeguards are in place for 9 This includes an explanation of the economic and financial circumstances justifying the debt restructuring, an outline of a viable economic program to address the underlying problems and its implica tions on the financial parameters shaping the envelope of resources available for restructured claims, the provision of a comprehensive picture of the proposed treatment of all claims, including those of official bilateral creditors, and the elaboration of the basis on which the debt restructuring would restore medium-term sustainability.
further use of the Fund's resources, and to assess whether the member's adjustment efforts are undermined by developments in debtor-creditors relations.
While beyond these procedural requirements, the LiA policy does not specify what the role of the IMF should be during a sovereign debt restructuring, there are a number of channels through which it can influence the outcome of a restructuring that go beyond the provision of financial support. First of all, as any IMF-supported program, programs around debt restructurings are constructed upon a macroeconomic framework including conditionality over domestic adjustment.
If domestic adjustment is interpreted as the counterpart of the "haircut" imposed on creditors as a result of the debt restructuring, the program's macroeconomic framework unavoidably influences the negotiation process. In addition, the IMF plays an important role as a provider of information given the heightened uncertainty that surrounds such episodes. Finally, the IMF can play an active role in a restructuring by and influencing the sovereign's decision to restructure and providing incentives to private creditors.
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Case studies Our analysis revolves around four factors which we consider key for understanding the outcome of the processes and re-framing the IMF's policy. Firstly, we compare pre-emptive and post-default restructurings. Second, we distinguish cases in which the restructuring was comprehensive and the authorities attempted to achieve a high degree of inter-creditor equity from those in which the authorities adopted a selective approach. Third, we study whether domestic and official creditors were treated differently from external creditors at the various stages of the crises. Finally, we focus on the Fund's role.
10 In some occasions, the Fund has taken part in meetings and issued comfort letters to support the exchange. 11 I excluded from the analysis cases in which the LiA policy applied as a result of minor external arrears which did not give rise to a broadbased sovereign debt restructuring. 12 We have included the recent restructuring in Belize, which was conducted without the umbrella of the IMF to provide us with a benchmark. 
Pre-emptive vs. post-default restructurings
A basic differentiation between restructurings is whether they were pre-emptive or were, instead, carried out following a sovereign default (Finger and Mecagni, 2006) . A pre-emptive debt restructuring is one that is carried out without incurring on arrears. Accordingly, the IMF should have been expected to act through the LiA policy in the post-default restructurings. However, the complicated due to the complicated dynamics of these episodes these associations need not be the case. Indeed, as a result of minor arrears with specific suppliers or commercial banks, the IMF acted through the LiA policy in some pre-emptive cases, such as the Dominican Republic and Dominica, where arrears were minor.
In principle, pre-emptive restructurings could be assumed to aim at addressing liquidity problems and post-default restructurings situations of insolvency. However, as shown in Table 2 , the mean debt to GDP ratio at the time of the restructuring is only slightly higher in post-default cases. 14 In pre-emptive cases as Jamaica or Uruguay, debt to GDP stood at 124% and 130%, respectively, at the time of the restructuring. In contrast, the debt to GDP ratio of Russia, a post-default case, stood at 51%. Similarly, both types of restructurings were, in general, preceded by large rises in the level of external debt. Also the liquidity indicators ( Given that neither sustainability nor the intensity of liquidity pressures suffice to explain the authorities' choice to remain current on debt payments, other factors must be at play. 15 One factor that may influence the authorities' choice is that remaining current on debt payments seems to facilitate the restructuring. Table 3 shows that pre-emptive restructuring were quicker to complete:
5 quarters on average against 10 quarters in post-default cases. In addition, countries that 14 Indeed, according to RR (2010) countries often default at relatively low levels of debt. 15 To some extent, the decision to default was circumstantial and highly influenced by country specific political or social factors or by the authorities' capacity to deal with the economic dislocation caused by a crisis. This was clearly the case in Argentina, where the default, announced following the fall of the elected government, signalled a change in the course of economic policies and to calm social unrest. In Ecuador, the default was a by-product of institutional weaknesses and fiscal rigidities, which constrained the authorities' ability to stabilize the economy and formulate an effective crisis resolution package. In Russia, the default was part of emergency measures passed after the Parliament derailed a stabilization package which could have resumed disbursements under the IMF's supported program. See Trebesch (2010) for more on the role of politics in explaining sovereign debt restructuring delays.
restructured pre-emptively managed, on average, to secure a higher creditor participation in the debt exchange than in the post-default scenario: 97% against 88%.
Yet, another incentive to restructure pre-emptively may be quickly recovering access to international financial markets. Indeed, all of the indicators used in Table 3 suggest that countries that remain current on external debt payments manage to tap international financial markets faster than defaulters. This was clearly so for Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Uruguay, and less so for Ukraine, Dominica and Pakistan which, in any case, had limited access to international financial markets also prior to the restructuring. In Belize the EMBI went below the 1000bp threshold in a less than a quarter. Among the post-default cases, Russia was the country that faster recovered access to international financial markets. This may be so because the Russian government defaulted on domestic securities while remaining current on post-soviet debt issued abroad. 4 Som e m inor bonds carried a higher haircut ( Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2005) . On the other hand, Table 3 shows that "haircuts", measured in NPV terms, were larger in postdefault restructurings than in the pre-emptive cases: on average 49% against 24%. 16 Furthermore, the share of debt affected by the restructuring both to GDP and to total debt was also higher in the post-default cases, implying that the extent of debt relief was significantly larger for defaulters.
Indeed, in pre-emptive cases the liquidity relief is felt only after the debt exchange. Instead, in post default cases the completion of the exchange has the opposite effect, as it coincides with the resumption of debt servicing. 17 Thus, defaulters may have a financial incentive to delay the agreement and search for harsher restructuring terms, while non-defaulters' best interest lies in reaching a quick agreement, which may come at the expense of lower debt relief.
The act of defaulting seems to alter the bargaining power in favour of the sovereign debtor. 18 The shift in bargaining power entailed by the act of defaulting is illustrated in Chart 1, where restructurings are ordered according to the authorities' degree of coerciveness. A comparison between the restructurings in Argentina and Uruguay is particularly illustrative: while the former took all its time to launch the debt exchange and impose large losses on bondholders, the latter followed a market-friendly approach, securing a fast settlement with moderate losses for investors. 16 Trebesch and Cruces (2011) also find that the higher the NPV imposed the longer the delay until market access was recovered. Post default cases are characterized by larger haircuts and spells out of the market. This helps qualifying the results in Trebesch and Cruces. 17 As illustrated by the Argentine case, delays in the settlement of a default can generate substantial savings in foregone interest payments.
18 Benjamin and Wright (2009) show that changes in debtor bargaining power affect the speed of debt settlement.
Chart 1: degree of coerciveness of pre-emptive vs. post-default restructurings
These differences underline a strategic component on the decision to default associated with the existence of a trade-off between greater debt relief and a quicker access to international financial markets. Ultimately, it is difficult to determine which category of restructurings had a better outcome. If the restoration of debt sustainability is taken as the main parameter to assess the outcomes of the restructurings, our case studies yield ambiguous results. Indeed, the two cases in which debt sustainability was more questioned following the restructuring were Argentina and Uruguay, which constitute to some extent the epitomes of our post-default and pre-emptive cases.
Although post-default cases were associated with larger troughs, comparing the evolution of postrestructuring GDP growth in pre-emptive and post-default cases also yields inconclusive results.
Inter-Creditor Equity: partial vs. comprehensive debt restructurings
The next distinction refers to whether the sovereign adopted a partial or a comprehensive debt restructuring strategy. Under the first approach, the sovereign focalized the restructuring in specific debt instruments. According to Erce and Diaz-Cassou (2010) , this was the case when liquidity pressures were mostly generated by these specific debt instruments, or when the sovereign tried to ring-fence certain categories of debt in order to limit the disruption caused by the restructuring.
Conversely, when the sovereign opted for a more comprehensive approach the main categories of debt were involved in the restructuring (with the exception of multilateral obligations given their preferred creditor status of the IMF). This is more likely to occur when liquidity pressures are widespread, so that restoring debt sustainability requires the involvement of most creditors, or when the sovereign wants to preserve some level of inter-creditor equity. Furthermore, the authorities have a "jurisdictional" advantage when dealing with domestic instruments, implying less disruptive litigations for the sovereign when involving domestic debt. Table 4 summarizes what instruments were restructured in each episode. Although in many events the country did finally include most debt instruments, many of our cases featured some degree of selectiveness at some point. In turn, the table below discusses the outcome depending on the strategy followed.
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NPV loss (%) Participation in the exchange (%) Duration (quarters) further feeding upward pressures on spreads. After these attempts to bridge liquidity pressures failed, the authorities of both countries were forced to broaden the scope of the restructuring.
Russia, however, managed to stick to a selective approach and limited the default to domestically issued bonds while remaining current on most internationally issued debt, with the exception of obligations inherited from the Soviet Union. In Argentina, the authorities tried to discriminate between various categories of creditors by phasing the restructuring: in phase I debt held by residents was exchanged for loans, and a phase II was designed to restructure debt held by non residents. Eventually, however, Argentina defaulted soon after completing phase I, and the restructuring was disorderly broadened to encompass most of its sovereign debt, reducing the government's room for manoeuvre to discriminate between creditors.
On the opposite side, at the outset of their respective debt crises, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Ukraine also tried to limit the scope of their restructurings to specific categories of debt.
Originally, Ecuador suspended coupon payments only on its PDI and Discount Brady bonds and tried to persuade investors to limit the restructuring to that type of debt. Eventually, however, Ecuador also defaulted on its Eurobonds and was forced to carry out a comprehensive restructuring which involved some categories of domestic and bilateral official debt. In Ukraine, as mentioned above, the authorities carried out a wave of selective restructurings during 1998 and 1999 involving specific domestic and foreign bonds as well as loans. This, however, simply postponed the problem and Ukraine was forced to launch a comprehensive restructuring of its international bonds as early as February 2000. In turn, Grenada, Uruguay and Dominica stand out as being cases in which the authorities went at great length to preserve a market-friendly approach during the restructuring process. To some extent, this was aimed at differentiating the restructurings from the disorderly Argentine default. One of the manifestations of this market friendly approach was the absence of discriminatory practices between types of creditors.
In order to learn more about the degree of inter-creditor equity in each of our episodes, Chart 2 compares the ex-ante structure of sovereign debt at the outset of the restructuring with the relative weight of the various types of debt ultimately involved in the restructuring, and the ex post structure of sovereign debt. In principle, cases where the relative weights of restructured debt are 19 It should be note, however, that Jamaica has been forced into a new program and a new restructuring episode recently.
similar to the ex-ante structure of sovereign debt should associate with a more comprehensive approach.
According to the Chart, the most comprehensive restructurings occurred in Dominica and Uruguay and, to a lesser extent in Grenada and Ecuador. 20 In Uruguay, creditors shared the burden of the restructuring quite proportionally to the ex-ante structure of sovereign debt, which tends to signal a rather comprehensive approach. However, even in that case, international loans were spared from the restructuring, presumably because they were a relatively minor component of total debt. In spite of the selective approach described above, the Argentine debt restructuring, together with the Dominican one, can be labelled as intermediate cases in terms of their comprehensiveness. In turn, the restructurings in Jamaica, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia and Belize were rather selective, including either only domestic instruments or international instruments. In the case of Russia this was partly due to the weight of Soviet era debt in the restructuring, and to the fact that the default was limited to domestically issued debt. In Ecuador, Pakistan and Belize, the selectiveness in the restructuring arises mainly because, to varying degrees, domestic creditors were spared from the restructuring. In Jamaica, which was engaged in an IMF program at the time, the focus was placed on domestically issued debt.
Residence-based breaches in inter-creditor equity: domestic vs. external creditors
Beyond the legal origin of the claims involved in a restructuring, the nationality of the investors holding the claims on the public sector has often been of great importance. Indeed, various recent episodes have featured a well differentiated involvement of foreign and domestic creditors in the crisis resolution strategy. 21 This was the case especially for Argentina, Jamaica, Dominica, Russia and Uruguay, and less so for Ukraine. In the cases of the Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Pakistan and Ukraine, domestic debt was either a minor component of sovereign debt, or was mostly spared from the restructuring. Financial globalization makes it increasingly difficult to align domestic and external debt with domestic and foreign creditors. While the jurisdiction of issuance has lost relevance as an indicator of creditors' nationality, domestic creditors have certain features that deserve special attention. These features of domestic creditors pose significant trade-offs for the authorities regarding the restructuring strategy ultimately chosen, as they create incentives to discriminate between resident and non-resident creditors.
First of all, residents are by definition subject to the domestic legal and regulatory framework, implying that the sovereign has more tools to encourage or even coerce their participation in a debt exchange and to make litigation less disruptive. Second, if the sovereign remains current on its obligations with external creditors while imposing a restructuring on domestic debt, it might retain some degree of access to international financial markets, especially if investors believe in the authorities' commitment and capacity to discriminate between types of creditors. Third, the restructuring of debt held by residents has a direct impact on the domestic economy, adding up to the burden already caused by the adjustment process triggered by the crisis. Furthermore, a large portion of the sovereign debt held domestically is often in the hands of banks and institutional investors such as pension funds. As a result, restructuring domestic debt can have a very negative impact on the solvency of the domestic financial system. On the asset side, the "haircut" constitutes a direct loss for financial institutions. On the liability side the restructuring can trigger a confidence loss and large scale deposit withdrawals. 22 Finally, political economy considerations could be at play, as residents may be more able to influence the sovereign's decision making process than foreigners. I find both types of discriminatory strategies. In Ecuador, and Belize, the terms of the restructuring were worse for non-residents, presumably in order to mitigate the impact of the restructuring on the domestic economy. In the cases of Argentina, Ukraine and Russia, however, the direction of this discrimination is ambiguous. In Argentina, during the pre-default phase of the crisis, the authorities went at great length to involve domestic creditors and even carried out a semi-coercive restructuring of debt held by residents which has often been equated to a domestic default. In this way, Argentina gambled for resurrection in an attempt to save the convertibility regime and to avoid external default. Once that strategy failed, the authorities focused restructuring external debt, although a substantial number of residents were ultimately also involved in the default. In Russia, the government defaulted on domestically issued debt while remaining current on post-Soviet debt issued abroad. This was mainly due to the fact that liquidity pressures stemmed mostly from the domestic market, although avoiding international litigation and mitigating the loss of access to international financial markets likely played a role. The non-residents that were caught in the restructuring of GKOs and OFZs, however, suffered worse terms, given that on top of the restructuring, they faced controls restricting the repatriation of cash proceeds. In Jamaica, the restructuring focused on domestically issued debt which was for the most in the balance sheet of local banks.
23 Table below Although our evidence is limited, some patterns regarding the involvement of domestic creditors emerge. The cases of Argentina, Jamaica and Russia suggest that prior to an external default domestic investors are more likely to be coerced into further accumulating sovereign debt or accepting some debt relief in order to provide the sovereign with breathing space to service external debt. However, once the sovereign has defaulted on foreign debt, as occurred in Argentina and Ecuador, non-residents tend to bear the restructuring's burden in order to soften the impact of the crisis on the domestic economy. The state of the financial sector is likely to play a role in this sequencing. Indeed, the Argentine banking sector was perceived to be in a relatively good footing prior to the default, which may have led to an underestimation of the risks associated with further increasing banks' holdings of sovereign debt. Instead, in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, a banking crisis originated the crisis, which probably encouraged the authorities to limit domestic banks' involvement in the restructuring. In Belize the amount of domestic debt was minor and external debt was mostly held by foreigners. In Russia, a low level of financial intermediation together with the public ownership of the main banks (and the ensuing implicit sovereign guarantee on deposits) may have reduced the perceived impact of the restructuring on the economy, thereby explaining its domestic bias. In Jamaica, the importance of foreign capital helps explain why the Government preferred to restructure domestic debt, which were mostly held by domestic banks.
Official debt
A very specific scenario arises when the authorities restructure bilateral official debt. In such circumstances, an agreement with the Paris Club (PC) is sought. An important condition usually attached to PC arrangements is the so-called comparability of treatment clause, which commits the sovereign to secure debt relief from private creditors on a similar scale as that granted by 23 Interestingly, the Government was forced into a new restructuring in 2013. This time they took an even more discriminatory approach and focused only on domestically issued debt in the hands of residents.
official creditors. As a result, when an agreement with the PC is reached, the scope for a subsequent selective approach is reduced. As shown in Table 5 , not all of our cases involved the Paris Club. In Uruguay, no treatment was agreed, presumably because bilateral official debt was a minor component of sovereign debt at the time of the restructuring. In Argentina, no comprehensive agreement with bilateral creditors could be reached. An important factor to consider when comparing outcomes is that the comparability of treatment principle is not reciprocal. Only if the Paris Club acts as the first mover is the sovereign committed to seek comparable treatment from private creditors. This asymmetry might pose incentives to make a strategic use of the timing of the PC involvement. Sovereigns may have an incentive to postpone PC treatments and retain their ability to discriminate among investors and types of debt or may want to meet the PC first when a broad restructuring of privately held debt is required.
The role of the IMF: Channels of influence in sovereign debt restructurings
The IMF was involved in all of our case studies but Belize through a financial program. Yet, as shown in the Appendix, the size, conditions and timing of these programs vary from case to case, with important implications for the role ultimately played by the Fund.
A first relevant distinction between the cases refers to the operational framework under which the involvement was articulated, that is, whether the LiA policy was effectively applied. Arrears with external private creditors co-existed with IMF supported programs in the cases of Argentina, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Russia and Ukraine. Instead, Jamaica, Uruguay and 24 In Serbia, the PC treatment was part of a broader effort to normalize the country after the end of the war, which required a substantial debt relief in order to clear existing arrears. In this sense, the PC agreement paved the way for the London Club agreement reached in 2004. 25 Negotiations between Argentina and the Paris Club were still on-going at the time of this writing.
Dominica were purely pre-emptive cases in which the sovereigns fully honoured their external obligations during the period under consideration. Also Belize was a pre-emptive case but, as me mentioned above, went through the entire process without resorting to the IMF. In Pakistan arrears were accumulated with official creditors and the LiA policy was never triggered. 26 In general, program-related documents rarely specify whether the LiA policy was activated, blurring the specificities of the policy. A first relevant aspect is whether the IMF exerted any discernible influence/provided incentives on the sovereigns' decision to default or restructure and on the creditors' decision to accept the exchange. This is not easy to tell given that, for obvious reasons, the discussions between the Fund and its members on such sensitive issues are not made public. However, in some cases observers believe the Fund played a significant role in the decision making process that resulted in the launching of the restructuring. This would be the case of Ecuador, Ukraine, Uruguay and Dominica, in the first case to address a clearly unsustainable situation, and in the latter cases to fill residual financing needs under the Fund supported programs. 31 Even more clearly this was the case in Jamaica, where the restructuring of domestic debt instruments was a prior condition for the signing of the corresponding IMF program. Also in Argentina and Russia, the Fund played a role in the decision to default, albeit an indirect one. In both cases, after having lost access to international financial markets, the suspension of the Fund's financial support dried up the last available significant source of foreign exchange to continue honouring sovereign debt.
As regards the provision of incentives to the parts involved in the process, the Fund has various instruments to provide such incentives. It has often tried to coordinate creditors by encouraging participation in the debt exchange. This has taken the form of a comfort letter issued by the IMF's managing director to the members of the financial community in support of the authorities' economic program and the terms of the restructuring. In some cases, the Fund has gone beyond the mere provision of its seal of approval. This was especially the case for Uruguay, Dominican
Republic, Dominica and Jamaica. Indeed, in Uruguay the Managing Director made it clear that an insufficient participation in the debt exchange could lead to a suspension of the Fund's financial support and, thereby, to a much higher likelihood of a sovereign default. Indeed, the Comfort letter issued on April 22, 2003 specified that "(…) achieving these objectives is a condition for completion of the next (third) review under Uruguay's stand-by arrangement. A successful debt exchange requires high participation to allow the program to go forward and the forthcoming review to be completed". In Jamaica, as in the Uruguayan case, by conditioning financial support to the conclusion of a debt exchange, the IMF made it clear to investors that cooperating with the authorities was the best way forward. In turn in Dominican Republic, during the consultation process that preceded the launching of the debt exchange offer, IMF staff participated in some of the informal contacts held between the Dominican government and its largest bondholders.
Additionally, the Fund's Managing Director released a letter to the members of the financial community, supporting the authorities' economic program and noting that a high participation would be crucial for the Dominican authorities to achieve its objectives (Diaz-Cassou et al., 2008 ).
As detailed above, the Fund has also used the good faith clause. By conditioning the Fund's financial support to the authorities' good faith, the Fund aims at creating incentives both to avoid the build up of arrears and to adopt a collaborative stance in the debt workout. However, in spite of the 2002 attempt to clarify its content, assessing compliance with the good faith criterion 30 This partly explains why the Fund's involvement in those events was so contentious 31 Stanley Fisher acknowledged in May 2000 having discussed with Ecuador the pros and cons of a default of, "pointing out the risks of disruptive legal challenges in case of a default and the difficulties of sustaining a viable cash position in case of staying current on debt obligations". Also the second review of Dominica's PGRF program refers to investors having agreed with both authorities and the Fund that a debt restructuring was necessary in addition to the financing provided by the Fund.
remains highly judgemental, as illustrated by the Argentine case. There, the Fund's program was not suspended on the basis of a breach of the good faith clause even if many observers (Simpson, 2006) argued that, rather than engaging in a constructive dialogue, the authorities simply presented a series of take or leave it offers clearly detrimental to creditors' interests.
An important aspect of applying more stringent conditions, such as the good faith, in the presence of arrears, is that these conditions focus on external private arrears. A second crucial dimension of the Fund's involvement is the setting of the resource envelope of the restructuring. This relates to the macroeconomic framework and conditionality embedded in Fund supported programs. During a restructuring, the level of domestic adjustment associated with the Fund's conditionality is unavoidably linked to the haircut on private creditors necessary to restore debt sustainability. 32 Thus, the establishment by the Fund of an adjustment path is likely to influence the negotiation between the sovereign debtor and its private creditors.
In most of the cases analyzed here, the IMF played the role of an adjustment agent through the programs approved in the context of the restructuring. Again, this was particularly clear when the Paris Club was involved early on, but it was also the case for Ecuador, Ukraine, Uruguay, Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica. Conversely, the Fund played at best a minor role in setting the resource envelope of the Argentine and Russian restructurings. In the latter case, the IMF programs were off-track when the novation scheme was carried out and when an agreement was time and the fact that the level of debt to be restructured was small might have helped facilitated investors accepting the Belizean deal.
Finally, there is the Fund's role as a provider of information. This dimension of the Fund's involvement is particularly relevant given the heightened uncertainty and informational asymmetries that characterize these episodes. No consistent approach seems to have characterized the Fund's involvement, as there are substantial variations in the amount of information disclosed by the Fund in the cases under consideration. This is likely due to the fact that member states have the right to preclude the Fund from disclosing certain market sensitive pieces of information. As a result, the informational role of the Fund tends to be more intense in 'market-friendly' restructurings. For instance, the Fund published most program-related documents in the cases of Dominica, Grenada, Dominican Republic or Uruguay. Instead, few documents were published in the cases of Argentina, Ecuador and Jamaica. Although references to debt sustainability are common in program-related documents, a fully-fledged debt sustainability analysis was not always provided.
Policy Lessons
An important lesson from this case-study analysis is that the flexibility under the Fund's current approach to debt restructurings can be seen as a lack of consistency. The current case by case approach has provided the Fund with flexibility to customize its crisis resolution strategies to potentially very different types of debt crises. And, while we have discerned several country specific factors shaping the Fund's approach to most of the dimensions analysed above, this lack of clarity exacerbates uncertainty and informational asymmetries, providing ground for criticism by creating the perception that creditors or debtors are treated unequally depending on the specific circumstances of each crisis. The international community, therefore, needs to decide whether the IMF should play a more standardized role in sovereign debt restructurings and, if so, in what dimensions and through which instruments.
An important obstacle to frame the Fund's role in debt restructurings is the lack of a policy or instrument designed specifically for that purpose. While very often, the Fund's programs in place during a restructuring are implemented under the LiA policy, there are significant exceptions in the context of purely pre-emptive restructurings such as Dominica's and Uruguay's, or when arrears arise only with official or domestic creditors, as was the case in Pakistan or Jamaica. Moreover, even the LiA policy fails to specify the role that the IMF is to play during sovereign defaults. Indeed, rather than a policy in the broad sense of the term, we see it as a device to legalize the Fund's lending in the presence of external private arrears, by introducing loose procedural requirements absent in 'traditional' programs. 33 This leads again to the question of whether this approach ought to be maintained or the Fund's role in these processes should be endowed with a clearer economic rationale by specifying the role to be played in various dimensions so as to contribute to improve the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings.
According to the Articles of Agreement, the IMF's firm policy is to avoid interfering with members' contractual obligations. 34 However, when a country's debt position becomes unsustainable, the IMF has a role to play in advising country authorities on the best course of action to minimize the cost of an unavoidable restructuring on domestic and international prosperity. In this respect, our case studies suggest that, as debt problems mount, countries have a tendency to gamble for redemption by applying partial measures in order to bridge short-term liquidity pressures. Such measures are often detrimental in the medium term, either by delaying the resolution of the crisis, increasing the burden of long-term debt, or by pushing the domestic financial system into 33 The LiA policy also applies to minor arrears not requiring a broad-based debt restructuring. I deliberately left this scenario out. 34 The articles of agreement establish that a crucial element of the Fund's mandate is to provide members with "opportunities to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity".
countries to adopt a comprehensive approach to restore debt sustainability at an early stage of the crisis, which may even require advising to restructure.
In the current context of financial globalization, the dividing line between domestic and external debt is becoming increasingly blurred. The Uruguayan episode where a resident bank sold a US$2.3 million claim on the government to a non-resident, who then made the case that the LiA policy ought to have been activated, and that the IMF should press the Uruguayan authorities to negotiate in good faith to clear that arrear, illustrates the ambiguity associated with basing the LiA policy in this distinction between domestic and foreign creditors. Due to this bias, the IMF might have devoted insufficient attention to the treatment of domestic creditors and its impact on the program's objectives. 36 Moreover, our analysis suggests that an extensive involvement of domestic creditors might signal a "gambling for resurrection" strategy and anticipate external solvency . Furthermore, the dimensions of the Fund's involvement that we have identified could apply both to pre-emptive and post-default cases. Indeed, the Fund's advice on the best course of action to restore debt sustainability as well as its role as an adjustment agent and provider of information and incentives were equally relevant in both 35 The Argentine mega swap, the Ukrainian piece-meal approach or the Russian pre-default debt swap are example of such measures.
36 Erce (2013) , using data on public payment delays and WEO's forecast errors, shows that public arrears depress output and employment 37 A possibility, put forward by Bedford and Irwin (2008) , could be to substitute the good faith criterion with price incentives, i.e. introducing a surcharge on LiA programs. According to them this would provide Governments with an incentive to engage early in a constructive dialogue. It may be difficult, however, to legitimize a surcharge when private creditors are being asked to absorb losses. 38 Indeed, there are some differences between current Fund's policies and some aspects of the Principles such as the use of the creditor committees (see Progress Report on Crisis Resolution, SM/05/107). 39 In Uruguay the IMF made the completion of the third program review conditional to a high participation in the exchange. It was quite clear at that point that a suspension of the Fund's financial support would have almost unavoidably resulted in a default. In Jamaica it was a PA.
scenarios. In this context, it is arguable whether the presence of external arrears to private creditors has more of an economic justification as a trigger of a specific IMF policy than a preemptive broad-based revision of the sovereign's debt terms.
As regards the Fund's provision of a 'resource envelope' through the macroeconomic framework and conditionality embedded in its programs. Some observers have argued that the Fund should restrain from fulfilling that function in order not to interfere with the negotiations between the sovereign and its creditors. They consider that asking the IMF to set the resource envelope of the debt workout is inconsistent with a market-based approach to handle sovereign restructurings.
Beyond the Belizean case, our case studies suggest that sovereign debt restructurings tend to be smoother when the Fund retains its role as an adjustment agent, especially if the Paris Club was involved at an early stage. In turn, the most disruptive and contentious restructurings analyzed here have been precisely those in which the IMF did not act as an adjustment agent. There is ground to argue, therefore, that the provision of a macroeconomic framework to anchor expectations does promote a constructive dialogue between the sovereign and its creditors. In any case, this is one of the dimensions where consistency is most needed.
40
An additional dimension is the informational role of the IMF. Information has public good features, implying that the private sector is likely to devote a sub-optimal volume of resources to it, especially in a world of securitized debt where individual bondholders are unlikely to have resources and know-how to carry out debt sustainability analyses (DSAs).
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As argued above, the amount of information disclosed by the Fund has varied substantially from case to case. In fact, the IMF has often restrained from systematically disclosing full-fledged DSA of countries engaged in a debt restructuring. A possibility to systematize the informational role of the Fund could be precisely that of requiring the institution to provide a DSA to the parts involved.
While this may conflict with the Fund's transparency policy, under which publication of the DSA is voluntary and a prerogative of the member, the very specific scenario posed by sovereign debt restructuring processes could constitute an exception to that rule. Countries could be required to accept the divulgation of their DSA as proof of their 'good faith'. 42 Our analysis has also revealed that large 'inherited' programs can impair the Fund's potential to play a substantive role in restructuring processes. Indeed, the Fund's ex ante financial exposure to the countries that launch a restructuring can create a conflict of interests, which increases with the size of the program. A modest ex ante financial exposure may facilitate the ex-post Fund's involvement by providing enhanced country-knowledge and a degree of continuity to the program relation. However, if exceptionally large, inherited programs can invalidate the debtor-in-possession argument justifying the provision of official finance and jeopardize the Fund's legitimacy as an adjustment agent and provider of information and incentives.
A possibility would be to automatically suspend 'inherited' programs. The member would lose access to undisbursed resources, and would not be expected to make repurchases until the resumption of private debt servicing. Such a reform, by committing the institution to provide fresh funding might have ex-ante effects.
The IMF might reduce lending ex-ante as to guarantee space for providing capital when problems arise. Observed have argued, however, that the IMF tends to over lend previous to financial crises at the cost of being forced to restrain from further lending when debt problems blow up. 43 The introduction of a standstill on purchases and repurchases of 'inherited' programs need not alter the seniority status of IMF loans because such obligations would never be made subject to a re-negotiation process. In fact, by reinforcing the DiP rationale, such a scheme could even reinforce the legitimacy of the Fund's preferred creditor status. 44 In addition, this framework would reduce countries' scope to threaten with defaulting on their multilateral obligations in order to press for the approval of successive program reviews during a sovereign debt restructuring. 
